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This study focuses on the impact of parliamentary parties on committees’ structure and activity in the post-
Soviet context. Through a case study of committees in Ukraine's Rada, the paper demonstrates that weak, 
fluid parties can act as a barrier to committees’ efficacy by shaping their structure, leadership and by 
blocking ameliorating reforms. Although Ukraine’s committees were formally allocated a significant role 
in the law-making process, in practice the realisation of this function was constrained by parties and also by 
context of the wider institutional uncertainty.  
It is widely accepted that committees are the primary organisation by which 
legislatures execute their functions and that as such strong committees are an essential 
precondition for parliamentary influence in policy-making.1 Moreover, it is 
affirmed with equal frequency that the strength of committees depends upon the party 
system: 'Where parties exercise only weak control over legislative committees, 
the committees are free to…make a strong contribution to the outputs of the 
legislature'.2 Yet it seems there is a minimum level of party organisation in parliament 
required for the effective functioning of committees.3 Olson and Crowther's recent 
study of post-communist committees concluded that unstable, polarised party 
systems were the least conducive to efficient, institutionalised committee systems 
because frequent party splits inhibited the development of links between 
committees and parties as it caused low member incumbency and non-proportional 
representation in committees.4 Post-Soviet parliaments suffer from weak, fragmented 
party systems. How does this impact on the structure and functioning of committees? 
Damgaard identifies three main ways in which parties influence committees - by 
allocating committee leadership and membership; by initiating 
2and processing legislative proposals; and by applying sanctions to party members for not 
adhering to the party line.5 This paper proceeds from Damgaard's propositions by looking 
at committees’ structure and ability to exercise their law-making functions and seeks to 
expand on Olson and Crowther’s findings about the relationship between parties and 
committees by illustrating that parties despite (or even because of) their low cohesion can 
act as a barrier to committee efficacy and to ameliorating reforms. In addition, the wider 
political context will clearly affect committees' and thus the legislature's exercise of law-
making and other functions.6  
Building on previous work on post-communist parliaments, this study seeks to 
tackle questions about the impact of parties on committee development in weakly 
institutionalised post-Soviet systems by drawing evidence from Ukraine's parliament, the 
Verkhovna Rada.7 Ukraine's committee system has been subject to little prior study, but 
shares the key features of post-communist committee systems identified by Olson and 
Crowther including: poor attendance; unstable relations between committees and parties; 
difficulties in achieving quorum requirements and a high volume of legislation to 
process.8 Therefore, this study will contribute supplementary evidence from a new case 
study,9 seeking to assess the ability of Ukrainian committees to perform their 
constitutionally-designated functions and to elaborate the influence of parties on the 
committee system. This work has been informed by the literature on committees, 
directing the enquiry to consider the impact of institutional attributes (structure and 
competences)10 upon committees' activities, and the descriptive-analytical approach 
broadly follows that widely used in exploratory research of committee systems 
elsewhere.11 The approach is open-ended and the aims of this paper are threefold: 1) to 
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elaborate the main contours of the committee system in Ukraine; 2) to analyse the ability 
of committees to execute their main functions, using the example of law-making; 3) to 
identify the barriers to committees' efficacy, focusing on the role played by parties. Given 
the exploratory nature of these research aims, qualitative research methods were most 
appropriate. Therefore, the research is grounded in fieldwork conducted in Kyiv in 2000 
and 2003 and the study is based largely on the current convocation elected in 2002. A 
range of data were collected to facilitate triangulation,12 and these included legislative 
figures provided by the Rada secretariat, newspaper reports, committees' 2002 end of 
convocation reports, observations of plenary sessions and interviews with over 50 senior 
parliamentary staff and elected deputies. All interviews are cited anonymously. 
The paper is organised into four sections. The first section provides an overview 
of the institutional context as essential background for the analysis to follow. Secondly, 
the structure and organisation of the committee system is considered. The third section 
examines the process of law-making to illustrate committees’ capacity to execute their 
functions and considers the impact of parties on committees’ activity. In sum, although 
committees developed the procedures and capacity to exercise their defined functions in 
the spheres of law-making, these remained patchy and incomplete. In key areas, the 
exercise of committees’ functions was circumscribed by the cross-cutting interests of 
parties in parliament and the wider political environment in a context of institutional 
uncertainty, suggesting that weak parties perpetuate committee weakness in certain 
circumstances.  
 
The Ukrainian Rada: Committees in Context 
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As sub-institutions of parliaments, committees are 'nested' within other institutions, of 
which the wider legislature, the political system and the regime type are particularly 
salient. This section will map out the key features and developments in Ukraine's political 
landscape and locate the committee system within this picture.  
 In 1991 the communist elites declared independence in order to retain their 
positions in the Ukrainian state, which meant that the new state was characterised by 
continuity in institutions and personnel from the Soviet era. The election of Leonid 
Kuchma as president in 1994 brought a partial change of power, but by the time of his re-
election in 1999, a regime was consolidating around Kuchma that could be characterised 
as semi-authoritarian.13 This regime has been convincingly categorized as a ‘blackmail 
state’, where the Kuchma regime utilised state institutions to preserve its own position, 
encouraging widespread corruption and monitoring it via the extensive surveillance 
systems inherited from the Soviet period.14 The 2002 parliamentary elections became 
embroiled in the regime’s struggle to ensure a compliant parliament that would assist 
their efforts to secure power beyond 2004, when Kuchma’s second term was due to 
expire. Therefore, the context at the regime level was one of uncertainty and growing 
authoritarianism, which included attempts by the president and his allies to control the 
elections to parliament and the behaviour of deputies once in the Rada.  
The political system was established in the 1996 Constitution – a president-
parliamentary system that formally balanced powers between the president and 
parliament,15 but lacked clarity so that the prerogatives of the two branches overlapped in 
terms of oversight and dismissal of the government and in law-making. However, in 
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many respects the president had precedence, especially regarding the formation, control 
and dismissal of the government.16 This arrangement meant that government survival was 
not dependent on the existence of a majority coalition of parties in the Rada, reducing the 
incentives for parties to form coalitions to support the government. The probability of a 
single party or coalition obtaining a majority of seats in the Rada was also reduced by the 
mixed electoral system, whereby half of (225) deputies were elected via party/coalition 
lists to parties/coalitions surmounting a 4 per cent threshold, while the other half were 
elected in single mandate constituencies, which facilitated the election of local notables 
or entrepreneurs as independents or only loosely tied to a party.17 In the context of a 
weak, fragmented party system, the division of powers engendered inter-branch friction 
and frequent attempts by president Kuchma to create a compliant parliament that would 
enact executive legislation. To this end, the president pursued a range of tactics, including 
the 'divide and rule' of parties, promoting constitutional change and twice stimulating the 
creation of pro-presidential coalitions (in 2000 and 2002). In March 2002, 221 deputies 
belonging to opposition parties or blocs were elected, compared to 149 for the pro-
presidential United Ukraine bloc and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) 
(SDPU(o)), yet via bribery, blackmail and distributing executive posts,18 Kuchma and his 
allies were able to put together a pro-presidential coalition by September 2002 of 226 
deputies (which later grew at the expense of the opposition – see figure 2).19  
Generating pro-presidential majorities was possible because of the large number 
of entrepreneurs elected to the Rada.20 A deputy’s mandate offered immunity from 
prosecution and the opportunity to lobby their business interests at the highest levels. 
Deputies with business interests to protect/advance were natural clients for the Kuchma 
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regime as they were susceptible to patronage (posts, apartments etc.) and blackmail (fire 
and tax inspections on their businesses).21 Many of these deputies were affiliated to pro-
presidential election blocs or elected as independents, but they were present in all parties. 
The high proportion of deputy-entrepreneurs in the Rada is one factor that helps to 
explain the incoherence of parliamentary parties and the difficulty of conceptualising 
them in terms accepted in Western political science.  
Heidar and Koole define parliamentary party groups (PPGs) as ‘an organised 
group of members of a representative body who were elected either under the same party 
label or under the label of different parties who do not compete against each other in 
elections, and do not explicitly create a group for technical reasons [gaining access to 
offices and resources] only’.22 However, it is problematic to define the political bodies in 
post-Soviet parliaments in this way because of the weakness of the party system and 
fluidity of parliamentary bodies that locally are referred to as ‘factions’ (meaning party-
based groupings) and ‘deputy groups’ (non-party based groupings). These local terms 
will be used due to this difficulty, but it must be stressed that the term ‘faction’ is being 
utilised only this local sense, and is not intended to imply any Western connotations of 
the term.  
Distinct from the Western European experience, post-communist parties have 
tended to emerge from within parliament, as elite configurations largely detached from 
‘society’.23 In Ukraine, party-based factions would house non-party members, while party 
members could and did join factions other than their party faction. Party factions and 
non-party based groups were often built around prominent individuals and on a regional, 
non-ideological basis after the elections (e.g. Regions of Ukraine (Donetsk); People’s 
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Choice (Luhansk); Democratic Initiatives (Kharkiv)).24 Deputies frequently changed their 
affiliation during the convocation, especially in the centre of the political spectrum.25 
Heidar and Koole’s idea of ‘personal kingdoms’ has some resonance here, whereby low 
group discipline and substantial resources result in ‘parliamentary medievalism’ within a 
PPG where regional and sectoral (business) interests were more important in shaping 
deputies’ affiliations. However, in Ukraine, the large number (12-15) of groups meant 
that some individual factions/deputy groups themselves resembled personal kingdoms.26 
After 1994 privileges and resources were extended to factions and deputy groups 
which permitted them to gradually increase their organisational capacity, increase levels 
of voting discipline27 (although this was undercut by membership fluidity) and take over 
the parliamentary leadership from committee heads by forming the Conciliation Council 
of Factions and Deputy Groups (see below). This experience mirrored that of other post-
communist parliaments, where paradoxically weak, fluid parties (factions) became 
central to parliamentary organisation and functioning, despite their limited capacity.28 
These circumstances shaped the trajectory of development for the Rada's 
committees. The Rada inherited a relatively well-elaborated committee system from the 
Soviet period, but the 'rubber stamp' nature of republican Supreme Soviets meant that 
these institutions were chronically underdeveloped to deal with the demands of a newly 
independent state. A committee system had been created in 1937, but committees gained 
little experience of legislative work. Therefore, after 1991 committees were compelled to 
elaborate the rules, procedures and norms for their legislative roles at the same time as 
performing them. The system that emerged and its role in law-making will now be 
examined.  
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Structure and Organisation 
 
A consensus in the legislative studies literature is that strong committees are at least a 
necessary condition for effective parliamentary influence in the policy-making process.29 
As the primary specialist bodies in a legislature, a strong committee system requires a 
highly differentiated structure and stable membership, which creates incentives for the 
acquisition of policy expertise. Although the Rada’s committee system formally shared 
many features with Western European parliaments such as a permanent structure that 
paralleled executive agencies and membership allocation based on proportional 
representation of factions, overlapping jurisdictions and factions’ membership fluidity 
acted as constraints on the emergence of a more streamlined and representative 
committee structure. 
 
Jurisdiction 
Formally, the activity of standing committees was regulated by the law 'on committees' 
(1995) and the Rada's standing orders (1994). However, new laws were required to bring 
the legal framework for committees' activities into conformity with the 1996 constitution. 
Nevertheless, substantial formal powers were allocated to committees compared to their 
western European counterparts:30 
 Consideration of bills by committees prior to their first plenary session debate 
(art.5.1, law ‘on committees’)31 
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 The power to redraft bills and to prepare draft legislation on their own initiative 
(art.5.1) 
 Strong information acquisition powers: state officials and entrepreneurs were obliged 
to provide committees with information and to attend committee meetings (art.10.2). 
This model of strong committees grew out of rules inherited from the Soviet-era, where 
committees were the formally main parliamentary sub-institution (and factions/deputy 
groups did not exist), but was also influenced by the experience of Western legislatures, 
especially US Congress.32 However, committee powers were circumscribed by the right 
of an amendment's author to insist on a plenary vote on his/her amendment and by the 
removal of the right of legislative initiative from committees with the passage of the new 
constitution in 1996.33  
 As in Western legislatures, committees' jurisdictions tended to parallel the 
structure of executive agencies, but the number of committees had to be decided at the 
start of each convocation. In 1994 and 1998 the Rada opted for 23 standing committees, 
and 24 in 2002 (see figure 1), a large number by European standards (10-20 is the 
norm),34 but closer to the Russian model (28 committees).35 Olson and Crowther suggest 
that having more than 20 committees is an indicator of a weak committee system36 and 
in the Russian and Ukrainian cases the maintenance of a high number of committees was 
the product of inter-faction competition for committee leadership posts.37 This led to the 
persistence of committees with overlapping jurisdictions and militated against numerous 
attempts at streamlining.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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For instance, three committees existed in the sphere of social policy: on social policy; on 
health, motherhood and childhood, and on pensioners', the disabled' and veterans' affairs 
(see figure 1). Moves to streamline the jurisdictions and reduce the overall number of 
committees were strongly resisted by factions/deputy groups, as this would have reduced 
the size of the 'pie' to divide between them (see below). In 2002, an additional committee 
was created on European integration with a vague remit that impinged heavily on that of 
the foreign affairs committee. This was not only inefficient, but engendered inter-
committee conflict. A member of staff from the European integration committee felt that 
‘the [foreign affairs] committee does not know how to cooperate with our committee 
…The foreign affairs committee does not respect us …’.38 Although conflict between 
committees is to some extent to be expected, in developed legislatures this tends to 
concern substantive issues of legislation (e.g. between an energy committee and an 
environmental one) but in the Rada, additional conflict was generated over jurisdictions. 
Deputies and staff generally reported that they were able to negotiate overlapping 
jurisdictions by holding joint committee meetings or informal arrangements, suggesting 
that the process was marked more by duplication than conflict per se.39 Nevertheless, 
such cases illustrate the pitfalls of an unclear division of labour and the way that weak 
parties can shape the structure of the committee system.  
 
Membership 
Across Europe, committees' compositions are based on the principle of proportional 
representation of parties represented in the chamber and on a deputies' professional 
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experience in order to maximise committees' authority in terms of representativeness and 
expertise in the wider legislature, while there is no prevalent trend in the procedure for 
allocating committee chairs.40 In the Rada, the formal procedure for forming both 
committees' leadership and membership was based on the idea that committees’ 
leadership and membership composition should proportionally reflect the chamber as a 
whole, but as in Russia in practice this was ‘an elastic guide’41 and the distribution of 
committee chairs tended to be a product of inter-faction bargaining while committee 
membership was not solely determined by the faction/group ‘quota’, but also depended 
on the degree of faction/group membership cohesion, policy preferences and on 
individual deputies’ preferences.  
As argued above, committee chairs were a key ‘prize’ for factions and after 1994 
their distribution was decided by inter-faction bargaining where a temporary coalition of 
factions and deputy groups agreed on a ‘package deal’. The negotiations over the 
distribution of committee chairs in May 2002 were particularly torturous because of the 
divided composition of the Rada (by May there were 209 ‘pro-presidential’ deputies 
belonging to United Ukraine and SDPU(o) and 227 ‘opposition’ deputies – see figure 2), 
the internal divisions both within and between these groups42 and the fact that the recent 
election of the speaker was regarded by the opposition as illegitimate: a positive vote 
(226 votes) for President Kuchma’s choice of speaker (Volodymyr Lytvyn, head of the 
United Ukraine bloc) plus two pro-presidential deputy speakers was found using bribery 
and blackmail.43 The loss of the speaker and deputy speakers’ positions due to their own 
internal divisions initially made the opposition cooperate more effectively over the 
division of committee chairs, which were widely recognised as important for lobbying 
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sectoral interests as well as providing material benefits like an apartment, cars, offices 
and staff.44 Thus, the debate about committee chairs’ distribution was quite openly 
framed in lobbyist rather than ideological terms. 
 Neither of the two competing camps in the Rada had the 226 votes necessary to 
adopt a package alone, but the situation was further complicated by ‘internal’ battles 
especially within the two largest groups United Ukraine and Our Ukraine, the former 
contained significant competing regional lobbies, while the latter housed several parties 
vying for key committee positions.45 As neither camp could adopt its own package, the 
Rada faced impasse. After nearly two weeks, the opposition won a key concession that 
the speaker’s and deputy speakers’ posts would be taken into account in distributing 
committee chairs on a basis proportional to the size of factions and deputy groups. After 
the failure of the pro-presidential camp to increase the number of committees, it was also 
agreed to elect first deputy chairs simultaneously, thus increasing the number of posts to 
divide. It was then possible to adopt a ‘package deal’ that allocated 19 chairs to 
opposition factions and 16 first deputy chairs to the two pro-presidential bloc.  
 The voting on the ‘package deal’ revealed divisions within United Ukraine and 
Our Ukraine, only the Communists and SDPU(o) voted in favour in full complement, 
while the Socialists and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc abstained.46 This indicated that voting 
majorities in the Rada would be ad hoc and that it was difficult to talk of ‘pro-
presidential’ and ‘opposition’ factions/deputy groups as these were very heterogeneous 
formations where groups of individual deputies were prepared to make deals that cut 
across any pro-presidential-opposition lines. Within days, United Ukraine split into 9 
factions and deputy groups along regional and party lines. As in previous convocations 
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frequent splits and the high degree of faction/group membership switching rapidly 
undermined the logic of the original package deal. Figure 2 provides an indication of 
faction splits, formation and membership switching after 2002. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
As in many other legislatures, committee members were formally assigned according to 
factions’ quotas with the aim of making committees’ compositions proportionally 
representative of the chamber. As figure 3 shows, in practice frequent faction switching 
and factions’ limited ability and willingness to adhere to the quota mitigated against strict 
adherence to this rule. In March 2003, 9 of 24 committees had members drawn from 7 or 
less factions (of 13). The most disciplined factions (especially the Communists) were 
largely able to allocate deputies according to the proportional quota (see figure 3), and 
discouraged deputies from switching committees once allocated.47 Other factions' lack of 
internal discipline made committee allocation largely dependent on deputies' individual 
preferences and less permanent, especially in the pro-presidential deputy groups where a 
large number of deputies were elected in single mandate constituencies and did not 
directly owe their election to a party.48 Consequently the most prestigious committees 
(e.g. budget; finance and banking; energy policy) were oversubscribed, while the least 
prestigious (e.g. culture and spirituality; human rights) struggled to attract members and 
were the most unrepresentative of the wider legislature (see figure 3). This was also 
reflected in the size differentials between committees, which were broadly consistent 
over time (see figure 1).  
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 illustrates how certain factions had a clear preference for certain policy areas, 
and this was most marked in the Agrarian faction, where over half of its members joined 
the agriculture committee. In addition, deputies switched factions regularly, but did often 
not change committee as a result, so any initial semblance of proportionality was rapidly 
eroded. Such a pattern was common in post-Soviet parliaments, as most factions lacked 
the institutional coherence to ensure proportional membership representation across 
committees.49 This had the effect of reducing the representative authority of the 
committee when its reports were examined by the whole chamber and also increased the 
potential for partisan conflict between committees.  
 
Resources  
In general, committees were comparatively well-resourced and staffing levels were high 
– around 16 persons per committee. This was closer to the US experience, where strong 
committees are seen as 'legislative workhorses', while committees in other parts of the 
world have just one or two consultants.50 After 2002, the situation improved markedly as 
speaker Lytvyn proved much more adept than his predecessors (who had been 
predominantly from the left opposition) at persuading the executive to release resources 
to the Rada to tackle long-standing problems.51 Thus, networked computers, internet 
access and more staff were suddenly made available. Nevertheless, deputies and staff 
continued to complain about insufficient experts to deal with the workload effectively, 
especially as the enormous volume of legislation to process was growing (see below).52  
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In sum, committees in Ukraine exhibited a number of formal attributes associated with a 
strong committee system. These included significant powers in law-making and 
informational acquisition, considerable resources and procedures for proportional 
membership to reflect the whole legislature's composition. In practice, the committee 
system was characterised by a number of features that limited the Rada's potential to play 
an influential role in the policy-making process: overlapping and unclear jurisdictions 
that engendered duplication and inter-committee conflict; unstable membership that 
reduced incentives for expertise accumulation and compositions that deviated 
significantly from the proportional principle, reducing committees' representative 
authority. The effects of these organisational attributes on committees' capacity will now 
be considered. 
 
Law-making Activities  
 
Law-making is one of the most crucial functions performed by committees around the 
world and is defined by the 1996 Constitution as the main task of committees in Ukraine 
(art.89). Therefore, while acknowledging that committees perform other functions such 
as oversight,53 an examination of committees' role in law-making provides a valid 
indicator of committee (and wider legislative) capacity. This section considers whether 
committees were able to influence the content of adopted legislation, which will be 
approached by considering committee’s role in the legislative process, before moving to 
examine committees’ interaction with factions and deputy groups, assessing how they 
impacted on committees’ law-making activities.  
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 If we look at the parliament as a whole, Olson places autonomy from the chief 
executive as central to the analysis of legislatures and draws attention to the '90 percent 
rule' whereby 90 percent of legislation is initiated by the executive and 90 percent of this 
is passed by the legislature.54 In Ukraine, as in other post-communist cases such as Russia 
and Poland, the legislature in general and committees specifically were much more active 
in initiating and adopting their own bills as well as amending government-drafted 
legislation. During the 4th session (September 2003-February 2004) 82.3 per cent of all 
bills examined were initiated by deputies. Of laws adopted, government bills comprised 
only 39 per cent, while most (55 per cent) were initiated by deputies.55 Those initiated on 
behalf of committees by a (usually cross-faction) group of their members were more 
likely than other deputies’ bills to be passed.56 The large proportion of legislative acts 
originating from the Rada rather than the executive can be interpreted as indicating 
significant legislative autonomy from the executive. The Rada's committees also became 
adept at processing very large quantities of draft legislation.57 However, the quality of 
legislation (including that initiated by the government) remained a cause for concern (see 
below).58 Committees can be seen as contributing significantly to the content and passage 
of legislation by examining bills prior to their first reading, preparing bills for second and 
third readings, producing so-called alternative bills that competed with government 
legislation and by influencing the timetable for a bill’s passage. 
The constitution and standing orders outlined a major role for committees in the 
deliberation and scrutiny of legislation. Committees recommended whether bills should 
be excluded in first reading and took primary responsibility for the preparation of bills for 
second and third reading. The main debates on bills, where amendments would be 
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included or excluded, increasingly took place in committees, rather than on the floor of 
plenary sessions.59 This can be seen as indicating the growing influence of committees on 
legislative work. There were also constant complaints about the quality of government 
drafted bills, which deputies and staff argued were frequently rushed and sometimes 
internally contradictory. One staff member encapsulated these feelings: 'They are rushing 
and send it [to the committee] before it is ready. Often [a bill] needs 2-3 amendments to 
one article and sometimes bills are [internally] contradictory'.60 It was therefore common 
for committees (or rather groups of 2-4 committee members) to draft and initiate 
alternative bills and present these for examination alongside or instead of government 
bills, and government bills were often amended substantially by deputies. While this 
placed greater pressure on committees' time and resources, it also gave them (and the 
Rada more generally) significant scope to shape the resultant legislation. Furthermore, 
deputies believed that committees' authority in plenary sessions was significant. Of 193 
deputies surveyed for USAID’s Parliamentary Development Project February-April 
2002, 50.8 per cent of deputies expressed the belief that the committee was the most 
important actor influencing the adoption of a bill, compared to 21.1 per cent who said it 
was the faction.61  
Committees also had considerable autonomy to control their own timetable. 
According to committee staff, committees themselves generally decided when to present 
bills to the Rada for plenary consideration by reporting on its status at the Conciliation 
Council of Factions (see below) and it was rare for a bill to be examined by the Rada 
without the committee’s agreement.62 Control over the timetable is a powerful resource 
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for committees and indicates that committees play an important role in the legislative 
process, but as with many procedures in the Rada this power was not formally laid down. 
The shift of the main debate on draft legislation from plenary sessions to 
committees, timetable control and the authority of a committee's recommendation 
suggests that committees played a major role in Ukrainian law-making, although the 
quantity and quality of laws remained problematic, factors which were influenced by the 
interaction of committees with factions and deputy groups in the legislative process.  
 
The influence of Factions, Deputy Groups and the Pro-presidential Coalition 
The influence of factions on committee’s legislative activities and on law-making more 
generally is complex and will be examined along three dimensions – majority-opposition; 
the faction system as a whole; and at the level of individual factions. It will be argued that 
in the absence of meaningful parliamentary participation in government formation, 
factions saw committees as a key resource for lobbying and obtaining benefits for their 
constituencies – both electoral and corporate, which created incentives for factions to 
block any attempts to reform the committee system. Committees were therefore flooded 
with hundreds of bills to process, many of them ill-conceived, populist or advancing a 
particularistic cause. Factions also played a key role in the setting the agenda and 
adopting legislation, although some were themselves influenced by the presidential 
administration.   
As stated above, the pro-presidential majority of 8-10 factions and deputy groups 
(see figure 2) was formed ‘artificially’ at the behest of president Kuchma as he sought to 
control the Rada in the run-up to the October 2004 presidential elections. However, 
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during its existence (September 2002 – September 2004), this majority proved to be 
ineffective due to competing regional and corporate interests between various factions 
that did not always coincide with the president’s preferences63 and the fact that many 
deputy-entrepreneurs belonging to the majority had businesses to run and did not attend 
either committee meetings or plenary sessions regularly.64 However, to talk of the 
opposition as a cohesive unit is also inaccurate. Distinct ideological differences existed 
between the communists and the national-democratic Our Ukraine which made it difficult 
for them to co-operate. Moreover, as in Russia, the communists were willing to play the 
role of ‘official opposition’, maintaining close links with the presidential administration 
and pro-presidential oligarchs that helped to fund them.65 As in previous convocations, 
communists regularly supplied votes to enable the ill-disciplined majority to adopt laws.66 
At other times, ad hoc majorities were found by Our Ukraine (or sections of it) with parts 
of the so-called majority. In most cases, staff and deputies reported that there was a trade-
off: the opposition could influence the content of legislation and opposition factions 
regularly provided the necessary votes to enable the (poorly-attending) majority to pass 
bills.67  
The system of factions and deputy groups in the Rada shaped committees by 
allocating their leadership and membership, by taking precedence in agenda-setting and 
by blocking any attempts to reform the committee system. As argued above, factions 
were strongly interested in maximising the number of committee chairs 'owned' by their 
faction and this blocked all attempts at reform. The repeated failure (at least six times in 
1997, 1999, 2000 and 2002) to adopt a new law on standing committees that would have 
brought committees' operation and jurisdiction in line with the constitution can be 
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understood in this context. The proposed bills laid down a list of just 17 or 19 committees 
and deputies and staff consistently reported that this was the most controversial provision 
which prevented its adoption on each occasion.68 This affected the structure of the 
committee system as a whole, leading to the preservation of an excessively large number 
of committees, often with overlapping and unclear jurisdictions, which in turn 
engendered inter-committee competition.  
   Factions also took precedence in setting the legislative agenda via the Rada’s 
coordinating organ, the Conciliation Council of Factions and Deputy Groups (CCoF). 
This body comprised the speaker and heads of factions as voting members, and deputy 
speakers and committee heads with an ‘advisory vote’ and could be attended by 
presidential and government representatives.69 Committee chairs reported which bills 
were ready for plenary examination, and in this way they were able to expedite or delay 
bills. As the majority was insufficiently disciplined to remove the opposition committee 
chairs in December 2002, this meant that opposition factions could exert considerable 
influence on the content and passage of legislation even after the formation of the pro-
presidential majority, and this was reinforced by the composition of committees, where 
the pro-presidential forces had a majority of members in only 12 of 24 committees (see 
figure 3). This helps to explain why individual opposition factions were willing to vote 
with their pro-presidential counterparts. 
 Shifting the analysis to individual factions and deputy groups indicates that they 
were able to influence the work of committees and the adoption of legislation in a range 
of ways, but that in turn faction decisions were sometimes shaped by presidential 
preferences.  Although most deputies believed that committees were the most important 
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actor influencing a law's passage, the analysis of roll-call votes conducted by the 
independent NGO Laboratory F-4 indicated that the faction's decision was the biggest 
influence on deputies' voting.70 As the quantity of legislation examined in plenary 
sessions was high, factions would provide deputies with instructions on how to vote on 
each bill.71 This meant that voting could be rather automated, and in more than one case 
the wrong bill was passed by mistake.72 Decisions on voting were taken not only on 
principle or by weighing the committee’s recommendation at faction meetings. There was 
evidence that on key votes the president (or his chief of staff) instructed the speaker to 
deliver a certain result. For example, a vote on a bill to change the electoral law was 
postponed because two pro-presidential factions who had been in favour of the bill 
refused to support it after an instruction from the president.73 Sometimes such votes were 
encouraged by direct payments or by the threat of a problem with a deputies’ business. 
Ex-president and pro-presidential deputy Leonid Kravchuk was matter of fact about the 
former process ‘If some-one is for sale, [pro-presidential oligarchs] will buy him. [In the 
Rada] everything occurs in this manner – voting and [faction] switching.’74 In this way, 
the wider political context of the ‘blackmail state’ directly influenced the passage of 
legislation. Although this suggests that factions themselves were weak actors, reminiscent 
of Heidar and Koole’s ‘personal kingdoms’, this was less true of opposition factions 
(socialists, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine) and factions’ impact on the 
operation of committees was still substantial, by initiating and lobbying bills and by 
taking faction directives to their committee meetings. 
 Interviews with deputies and parliamentary staff overwhelmingly suggested that 
the position of a faction or group was most crucial not only in determining deputies’ 
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voting decisions, but also in shaping their behaviour in committees. Committee chairs 
were increasingly beholden to the faction for their position, while deputies would find out 
the faction’s position on a bill prior to its discussion at committee.75 Therefore, factions 
had a direct input into the deliberation of legislation, a relationship reinforced by the 
faction basis of committee assignments. However, due to the frequent faction switching, 
this link was not always a stable one. 
 Some factions (Socialists, Communists and Our Ukraine) were eager to 
demonstrate their activeness to potential voters and encouraged deputies to exercise their 
right of legislative initiative by circulating statistics on this.76 This, along with deputies’ 
corporate interests helped to stimulate a deluge of bills for committees to process. 1928 
bills were initiated in the third session (February-July 2003) alone. The opinions of 
committee staff expressed in interviews were exemplified by a senior figure from an 
economic committee:  
‘There are so many unprofessional, empty bills. Factions should filter out their 
members’ bills. The problem is … that legislative initiatives are directed to 
[deputies’] own interests. Of 339 bills [currently in the committee], half of them 
are on tax … and we have to examine them.’77 
Some bills were directed towards constituents and others to corporate interests. For 
example, the socialists were alleged to have insisted on heading the education committee 
because teachers and lecturers were among their key constituencies.78 Consequently, 
committees (especially on economic policy and on finance and banking) were overloaded 
with enormous quantities of bills, diluting available resources to work on individual bills 
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and also reducing the time available for other activities such as oversight or holding 
hearings.  
 
Conclusions 
Damgaard demonstrates how parties constrain and control the behaviour of their 
members and thus reduce committee autonomy to secure the prevalence of party goals in 
decision-making.79 The Ukrainian case illustrates that even an extremely weak and 
fragmented faction system can act as a significant constraint on committees' autonomy in 
an uncertain institutional environment. Where some factions even lack a (de facto) extra-
parliamentary party, where membership is fluid (and often for sale) and where, due to 
the transience of parties between elections, the sanctions and inducements available to 
parties are minimal (e.g. a party career path) – even in these circumstances factions can 
exert a major influence on the structure and activity of committees. In the Ukrainian 
case:  
 Factions' interest in committee chairs and influence over spheres of the legislative 
process affected the structure of the committee system, leading to the maintenance of 
a large number of committees with overlapping jurisdictions, a factor which in turn 
generated duplication and inter-committee conflict.  
 Factions sought to benefit their various constituencies via the legislative process, 
overloading committees with hundreds of bills 
 Factional membership fluidity and weak discipline led to deviations from the 
proportional principle, so that committees were unrepresentative of the wider 
chamber 
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 Their control of the legislative agenda and increasing voting discipline meant that 
factions were increasingly instrumental in deciding on the passage of legislation 
 Factions consistently blocked attempts to reform the committee system 
The case study illustrates how pervasive the impact of a weak, fragmented party system 
can be, throwing up a range of challenges for committee development. Yet the influence 
was largely negative in the sense that factions could block reforms that threatened their 
interests, but at the same time they were incapable of pushing through an 'alternative' 
reform agenda to maximise their interests. This supports Olson and Crowther's 
proposition that unstable, polarised party systems are least conducive to a strong, 
effective committee system, while problematising the under-theorised relationship 
between parties and committees. This and other research on post-Soviet parliaments80 has 
shown this relationship to be a complex one that is structured by the wider institutional 
context. As such, equations about weak committees coexisting with strong parties and 
vice versa may obfuscate more that they reveal. Comparative research into the impact of 
party systems on committees' structures, activities and capacity needs to be undertaken to 
underpin more theory building about the most important relationship inside legislatures.    
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Figure 1:  Committees in Ukraine’s Parliament 
Committee No. of 
members, 
1994-8 
No. of 
members, 
1998-2002 
No. of 
members, 
March 2003 
Legal policy 16 22 23 
State-building & local councils 13 21 21 
Social policy & labour 15 13 10 
Health, motherhood & 
childhood 
9 11 10 
Youth, sport & tourism 8 17 10 
Science & education  18 16 11 
Culture & spirituality 13 11 10 
Economic policy  27 23 27 
Budget 30 26 39 
Finance & banking 28 29 35 
Industrial policy and enterprises 22 17 22 
Fuel-energy complex, nuclear 
policy and safety 
Ω 27 33 
Construction, transport and 
communication 
Ω 17 24 
Agricultural policy and land 
relations 
37 24 23 
Ecological policy and Chornobyl  12 17 
Law-enforcement 15 17 16 
Organised crime & corruption 25 17 16 
Defence & national security 27 21 14 
Standing Orders, deputies' ethics 
and organisation of Verkhovna 
Rada  
9 17 14 
Freedom of speech and mass 
media 
10 21 13 
Human rights and minorities 16 16 12 
Pensioners, veterans & disabled - 13 9 
Foreign policy 20 27 21 
European Integration - - 10 
Figures show end of each convocation, with the exception of 2003, where the committee size on 25 March 
2003 is given, at the time of the fieldwork.  
Ω indicates that these committees did not exist in this form between 1994-8. Instead there was a 
committee on fuel-energy complex, transport and communication (25 members), one on nuclear policy 
and safety (9) and one on the Chornobyl’ catastrophe (8).  
Source: www.rada.gov.ua 
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Figure 2: Changing Parliamentary Composition, 2002-4  
Faction  21 May 
2002 
15 July 
2002 
11 July 
2003 
2 July 
2004 
No. of 
committee 
chairs 
May 2002 
No. of 
committee 
chairs 
Mar 2003 
Social Democratic Party 
(United) (SDPU(o)) 
31 34 37 40 1 1 
United Ukraine 178 11 - - 4  
Party of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs/Labour Ukraine 
- 38 43 - - 2 
Labour Ukraine - - - 29 -  
Regions of Ukraine - 36 47 63 - 2 
European Choice - 18 20 - -  
Democratic Initiatives - 17 23 - -  
People's Power - 17 19 - -  
Democratic Initiatives – 
People’s Power 
- - - 30 -  
Agrarian Party of Ukraine 
(APU) 
- 16 16 21 -  
People's Democratic Party 
(NDP) 
- 17 15  - 1 
People’s Democratic Party and 
Party of Entrepreneurs 
- - - 17 -  
People's Choice/Union*  - 15 14 17 -  
Centre - - - 17 -  
Total Pro-presidential 
Majority 
- - 234 234 -  
       
Our Ukraine 119 110 102 100 10 10 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko 23 23 18 19 2 2 
Socialist Party (SPU) 21 21 20 20 1 1 
Communist Party (KPU) 64 63 60 59 6 5 
Total Opposition 227 218 200 198   
       
Non-affiliated deputies 11 11 16 18 -  
* Changed name to Union in May 2004 
Source: www.rada.gov.ua NB. For 2002, only 447 deputies had mandates according to the Rada website.  
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